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Abstract
Graph-based speciﬁcation formalisms for access control (AC) policies combine the advantages of an intuitive
visual framework with a rigorous semantical foundation that allows the detailed comparison of different policy
models. A security policy framework speciﬁes a set of (constructive) rules to build the system states and sets of
positive and negative (declarative) constraints to specify wanted and unwanted substates. Several models for AC
(e.g. role-based, lattice-based or an access control list) can be speciﬁed in this framework. The framework is used
for an accurate analysis of the interaction between policies and of the behavior of their integration with respect to the
problem of inconsistent policies. Using formal properties of graph transformations, it is possible to systematically
detect inconsistencies between constraints, between rules and between a rule and a constraint and lay the foundation
for their resolutions.
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1. Introduction
Aconsiderable amount ofwork has been carried out recently onmodels and languages for access control
(AC). AC is concerned with determining the activities of legitimate users [19], and is usually enforced by
a reference monitor which mediates every attempted access by a subject (a program executing on behalf
of a user) to objects in the system. The three main AC policies commonly used in computer systems are
discretionary policies [19], lattice-based policies (also called mandatory policies) [17] and role-based
policies [18].
One of the main advantages of separating the logical structure from the implementation of a system is
the possibility to reason about its properties. In [10,12] we have proposed a formalism based on graphs and
graph transformations for the speciﬁcation of AC policies. This conceptual framework, used in [10,12] to
specify role-based policies, a lattice-based access control (LBAC) policy and an access control list (ACL)
(example of a discretionary policy), allows the uniform comparison of these different models, often
speciﬁed in ad hoc languages and requiring ad hoc conversions to compare their relative strengths and
weaknesses.
Our graph-based speciﬁcation formalism for AC policies combines the advantages of an intuitive
visual framework with the rigor and precision of a semantics founded on category theory. In addition,
tools developed for generic graph transformation engines can be adapted to, or can form the basis for,
applications that can assist in the development of a speciﬁc policy.
We use in this paper examples from the LBAC and the ACL models only to illustrate the different
concepts, with no pretence of giving complete or unique solutions by these examples.
The main goal of this paper is to present some basic properties of a formal model for AC policies based
on graphs and graph transformations and to address the problem of detecting and resolving conﬂicts in
a categorical setting. A system state is represented by a graph and graph transformation rules describe
how a system state evolves. The speciﬁcation (“framework”) of an AC policy contains also declarative
information (“invariants”) on what a system graph must contain (positive) and what it cannot contain
(negative). A crucial property of a framework is that it speciﬁes a coherent policy, that is, one without
internal contradictions. Formal results are presented to help in recognizing when the positive and the
negative constraints of a framework cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed, when two rules, possibly coming
from previously distinct subframeworks, do (partly) the same things but under different conditions, and
when the application of a rule produces a system graph that violates one of the constraints (after one or
the other has been added to a framework during the evolution of a policy). The solutions proposed on a
formal level can be made part of a methodology and incorporated into an access control policy evolution
assistant.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy reviews lattice-based access control; Section 3
presents the basic formalism of graph transformations using lattice-based access control to illustrate
it; Section 4 deﬁnes the formal framework to specify AC policies (its main properties are relegated
in the appendix); Section 5 deals with the integration of policies and Section 6 discusses the notion
of coherence of a security policy framework. Section 7 discusses analysis and management of conﬂicts
between constraints and between rules, while Section 8 discusses conﬂicts between a rule and a constraint;
the last section mentions related and future work.
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Fig. 1. A security lattice (left-hand side) and the assignment of security levels to subjects and objects (right-hand side).
2. Lattice-based access control
Classic lattice-based access control (LBAC) enforces unidirectional information ﬂow in a lattice of
security levels. 1 The diagram on the left-hand side of Fig. 1 shows a partial order security lattice, where
the security levels available are H (highest), L (lowest) and M1, M2 (middle).
The LBAC policy is expressed in terms of security levels attached to subjects and objects. A subject is
a process in the system and each subject is associated to a single user, where one user may have several
subjects concurrently running in the system. An object is a container of information, e.g. a ﬁle or a
directory in an operating system. Usually the security levels on subjects and objects, once assigned, do
not change. If (x) denotes the security level of x (subject or object) then the speciﬁc LBAC rules for a
lattice allow a subject S to read object O if (S)(O) and to write object O if (S) = (O).
The subjects in Fig. 1 on the right-hand side are S1 and S2, with security levels (S1) = H and
(S2) = L. The objects are O1 and O2 with security levels (O1) = M2 and (O2) = L, respectively.
The LBAC rules ensure that S1 can read both objects O1 and O2 but cannot write either O1 or O2.
Subject S2 can read and write object O2, but neither read nor write object O1. In the Bell-LaPadula
model [2], subjects are allowed to write “blindly” in objects that they cannot read. In such a model, S2
can write in both objects O1 and O2, but is still able to read only O2.
3. Graph transformations
This section introduces the basic deﬁnitions and notation for graph transformations [16]. Parts of the
LBAC model are used throughout the section to illustrate the explanations by examples.
A graph G = (GV ,GE, sG, tG, lG) consists of disjoint sets of nodes GV and edges GE , two total
functions sG, tG : GE → GV mapping each edge to its source and target node, respectively, and a
function lG : GV ∪GE → Labels assigning a label to each node and to each edge. Labels are elements
of a disjoint union of sets Labels = X ∪ C, where X is a set of variables and C is a set of constants.
A binary relation ≺⊆ Labels × Labels is deﬁned on Labels as (, ) ∈≺ if and only if  ∈ X. This
binary relation is not a partial order since several distinct variables may be needed [15]. The relation
 ≺  indicates that (the variable)  can be substituted by  (which, in turn, can be either a variable or a
constant)
A path of unspeciﬁed length between nodes a and b is indicated by an edge a ∗→ b which can be seen
as an abbreviation for a set of paths, each representing a possible sequence of edges between a and b.
1 In [17], security levels are called security labels. We use ‘security level’ here to avoid confusion with the notion of a label
for a node or for an edge in a graph.
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Fig. 2. The type graph for the LBAC model.
A total graph morphism f : G→ H between graphs G = (GV ,GE, sG, tG, lG) and H = (HV ,HE,
sH , tH , lH ) is a pair (fV , fE) of total mappings fV : GV → HV and fE : GE → HE that respect the
graph structure, i.e.fV ◦sG = sH ◦fE andfV ◦tG = tH ◦fE , respect the label order, i.e. lG(v) ≺ lH (fV (v))
for each v ∈ GV and lG(e) ≺ lH (fE(e)) for each e ∈ GE (a variable can be replaced by a constant or by
another variable), and respect the substitutions, i.e. if lG(v1) = lG(v2), then lH (fV (v1)) = lH (fV (v2))
for all v1, v2 ∈ GV and lG(e1) = lG(e2), then lH (fE(e1)) = lH (fE(e2)) for all e1, e2 ∈ GE (different
instances of the same variable are substitutedwith the same value). A partial graphmorphism f : G ⇀ H
is a total graph morphism f¯ : dom(f ) → H from a subgraph dom(f ) ⊆ G to H. Graphs and partial
graph morphisms form a category GraphP. The subcategory of graphs and total graph morphisms is
denoted by Graph.
The category GraphP is in general not co-complete, but has pushouts for morphisms fp : G ⇀ H
and fc : G ⇀ K where one of them, say fp, is label preserving, i.e. lG(x) = lH (fp(x)) for each x ∈ G
(node or edge) [15].
A type graph TG represents the type information in a graph transformation system [3] and it
speciﬁes the node and edge types which may occur in the instance graphs modeling system
states.
For example, the type graph in Fig. 2 shows the possible types for the LBAC graph model. It provides
the node types U,O,P, val and SL. The node U is the type of the nodes representing users, the node
O the objects, the node val the actual information in objects and the node P the processes that run on
behalf of users. The node SL with its loop represents a whole security lattice, that is, a partial order on
security levels as e.g., High > Middle1 > Low,High > Middle2 > Low. The node SL can be any
security level (e.g.High,Middle1,Middle2, Low) and there is an edge from security level SL1 to SL2
if SL1 > SL2. The attachment of security levels to objects, users and processes is modeled by an edge
to a security level of the security lattice. The absence in the type graph of an arc between the nodes P and
O indicates that there cannot be, in any instance graph, a direct (access control) “connection” between
a process and an object. The presence in the type graph of an arc from O to SL indicates that an object
may be associated with security levels, but is not required to be (this requirement is expressed by the
constraints in Fig. 6)
A pair 〈G, tG〉, where G is a graph and tG : G → TG is a total graph morphism, is called a graph
typed over TG. If the type graph is ﬁxed, we denote the pair simply as G. The total graph morphism
tG is called typing morphism and is indicated in the examples by the symbols used for nodes and
edges. From now on, in all our ﬁgures the typing morphism maps a node with label Tx to the type
node T.
A morphism between typed graphs 〈G, tG〉 and 〈H, tH 〉 is given by a partial graph morphism
f : G←↩ dom(f )→ H that preserves types, that is, the diagram
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in Graph commutes. The morphism is total if the underlying graph morphism is total.
Graphs typed over a ﬁxed type graph TG and morphisms between them form a category TG [3]. The
existence of pushouts is inherited from the category GraphP.
A graph typed over a type graph TG can be re-typed over TG′ if there is a total morphism f : TG→
TG′. The re-typing by f of a graph 〈G, tG〉 typed over TG is the graph 〈G, f ◦ tG〉 typed over TG′. Re-
typing from TG′ to TG is a renaming of types and a forgetting of nodes and edges. Formally, the re-typing
w.r.t. a morphism f : TG → TG′ is speciﬁed by functors Ff : TG → TG′ and Vf : TG′ → TG,
called forward typing and backward typing functor [3,6].
General Assumption. In the following, we ﬁx a type graph TG, and all graphs and morphisms are
from the category TG if the type is not explicitly stated.
Notice that types are used to establish similarities among different entities (nodes and edges) while
labels are used to distinguish among similar entities.
A graph rule p : r , or just rule, is given by a rule name p, from a set RNames, and a label preserving
injective morphism r : L ⇀ R. The graph L, left-hand side, describes the elements a graph must contain
for the rule p to be applicable. The partial morphism is undeﬁned on nodes/edges that are intended to
be deleted, deﬁned on nodes/edges that are intended to be preserved. Nodes and edges of R, right-hand
side, without a pre-image are newly created. Note that the actual deletions/additions are performed on
the graphs to which the rule is applied.
Example 1 (LBAC graph rules). Fig. 3 shows the schemes for the rules of the LBAC policy. The labels
for the nodes (Ux, Px, SLx, SLy, . . .) of the rules are variables taken from the set of variables in Labels.
The rule new object creates a new object Ox connected to a node valx (the initial value of the
object). The object Ox is given the security level SLx. The variable SLx is generic: it is substituted by
the actual security level of the process when the rule is applied. The rule delete object for the
deletion of objects is represented by reversing the partial morphism of the rule new object. The rule
new process creates a process Px on behalf of a userUx. The new process Px is attached to a security
level SLy that is no higher than the security level SLx of the user Ux in the security lattice graph. This
valx
Ux Ux
Ux Ux
delete object
new object
Px Px
SLx
SLx SLx
delete process
Pxnew process* *
SLy
SLx
Px SLy
Ox
Fig. 3. Graph rules for the LBAC policy.
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Fig. 4. Application of rule new process.
requirement is speciﬁed by the path from SLx to SLy indicated by an edge decorated by a “*”: this is
a shortcut in our diagrams to denote a set of rules, each with a path of different length (possibly zero)
connecting the nodes labeled SLx and SLy consisting of edges of the security lattice graph. Processes (and
their connections to the user) are removed by the rule delete process.
For the application of rules we use the single pushout (SPO) approach to graph transformations [4].
Formally, the application of a graph rule p : L r⇀R to a graph G is given by a total graph morphism
m : L → G, called match for p in G. The direct derivation Gp,m⇒ H from G to the derived graph H is
given by the pushout of r and m in TG (see the diagram below). Note that the pushout exists, since the
rule morphism r is label preserving [15].
Example 2 (Application of a graph rule). In Fig. 4, the left-hand side L of the rule new process
occurs several times in G. In one possible match, the node Ux in L is associated to the node U2 in G and
the nodes SLx and SLy to the speciﬁc security level H. The application of the rule inserts the new process
node connected to the user U2 and the security level H.
For the speciﬁcation of AC policies by graph transformations, negative application conditions for rules
are needed [4]. A negative application condition (NAC) for a rule p : L r⇀R consists of a set A(p) of
total injective morphisms ai : L→ N , where the partN \ai(L) represents a structure that must not occur
in a graph G for the rule to be applicable. In the ﬁgures, all negative application conditions are simple
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Fig. 5. LBAC rules for modifying the security lattice.
inclusions and we depict ai : L → N by the graph N, where the subgraph L is drawn with solid lines
and N \ L with dashed lines. A rule p : L r⇀R with a NAC A(p) is applicable to G if there is a total
morphismm : L→ G (L occurs inG) and there is no total morphism ni : N → G such thatm = ni ◦ai
(it is not possible to extend L to N) for any ai : L→ N in A(p). From now on, a match for p with NAC
A(p) is a total morphism m : L→ G that cannot be extended to a total morphism ni : N → G for any
ai : L→ N in A(p).
Example 3 (Negative application condition). Fig. 5 shows the rules for modifying the security lattice.
New security levels can be inserted before an existing security level SLx (rule new level 1), after an
existing security level SLx (new level 2) or between two security levels SLx and SLy (new level
3). The rule delete level removes a security level that does not connect two security levels, i.e.,
SLx has no predecessor SLz and SLx has no sucessor SLy (expressed by the ﬁrst pair (L,N) of the
NAC). Therefore, it is not possible to delete a security level between two security levels, to ensures that
the security level hierarchy remains connected. More complex rules can specify the deletion between
security levels, but they are not introduced here. Since users, processes and objects need a security level,
security levels cannot be removed if any user, process or object possesses this security level. Therefore, the
NAC of the rule delete level has also the following three pairs (L,N): one to prevent the deletion
of a security level that belongs to a process (the NAC with dashed node Px), the second one concerns the
users (dashed node Ux) and the third one the objects (dashed node Ox). Only if (each condition in) the
NAC is satisﬁed, a security level can be removed.
4. Security policy framework
This section presents the framework for the speciﬁcation of AC policies based on graph transforma-
tions [9]. The framework is called security policy framework and consists of four components: the ﬁrst
component is a type graph that provides the type information of the AC policy, and the second component
is a set of graph rules (specifying the policy rules) that generate the graphs representing the states of
the system accepted by the AC policy. Since in some AC policies it is meaningful to restrict the set of
system graphs constructed by the graph rules (as not all of them represent valid states), a security policy
framework contains also two sets of constraints. Constraints can be negative constraints to specify graphs
that shall not be contained in any system graph and positive constraints to specify graphs that must be
explicitly constructed as parts of a system graph. In any implementation of an AC policy, the constraints
are not needed since the only acceptable states are those explicitly built by the implemented rules. But
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Fig. 6. Positive and negative constraints for LBAC.
when developing an AC policy through successive reﬁnement steps, or when trying to predict the behav-
ior of a policy, it is useful to have the additional information provided by the constraints. Positive and
negative constraints can be considered as a formal documentation of the initial requirements and of the
development process of rules.
Both positive and negative constraints are formally speciﬁed by morphisms [8]. It is the semantics of
the morphism that distinguishes between positive and negative constraints.
Deﬁnition 4 (Constraints). A constraint (positive or negative) is given by a total graph morphism c :
X → Y .
Deﬁnition 5 (Constraint satisfaction). A total injective graph morphism k : X → G satisﬁes a positive
(negative) constraint c : X → Y if there exists (does not exist) a total injective graph morphism q : Y →
G such that X c→Y q→G = X k→G. A graph G satisﬁes a positive (negative) constraint c if each total
injective graph morphism k : X → G satisﬁes c.
A graph G vacuously satisﬁes c : X → Y if there is no total graph morphism k : X → G; G properly
satisﬁes c otherwise.
A negative constraint c : X → Y is equivalent with respect to satisfaction to the simpler negative
constraint cY : Y → Y . The former form is more intuitive for a policy designer than the latter one, in
the sense that it is easier to see exactly which parts are allowed (X) if the remaining parts (Y \X) do not
occur.
Example 6 (Constraints for LBAC). Fig. 6 shows positive and negative constraints for the LBACmodel.
The positive constraint c1 and the negative constraint c2 require that objects always have a security
level (the positive constraint) and that there does not exist more than one security level for each object
(negative constraint). The constraints c3 and c4 specify the same existence and uniqueness requirements
for subjects. In mandatory access control policies, there is usually no concept of an owner of an object.
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Since LBAC belongs to the class of mandatory access control policies, the negative constraint c5 forbids
an edge between a user and an object to indicate object ownership by users. Actually, this is already
expressed in the LBAC type graph. If we consider the evolution of access control policies, the constraint
c prevents changing the policy to a policy with a concept of ownership.
We are now ready to deﬁne a security policy framework, which is characterized by a type graph (of
all the graphs involved), by a set of rules (from the set of all rules built with instances of that type graph)
with associated names, and sets of constraints. Formally:
Deﬁnition 7 (Security policy framework). A security policy framework, or just framework, is a tuple
SP = (T G, (P, rP ), Pos,Neg), where
• TG is a type graph,
• the pair (P, rP ) consists of a set of rule names P and a total mapping rP : P → |Rule(T G)|mapping
each rule name to a rule L
r
⇀R of TG-typed graphs,
• Pos is a set of positive constraints, and Neg is a set of negative constraints.
The security policy framework for the LBAC policy consists of the type graph in Fig. 2 and the
negative c2, c4, c5 and positive c1, c3 constraints in Fig. 6. The rule names {newprocess, deleteprocess,
newobject, deleteobject} are mapped to the rules in Example 1.
A security policy framework morphism f : SP1 → SP2, or just framework morphism,
relates security policy frameworks by a total graph morphism fTG : TG1 → TG2 between the
type graphs and a mapping fP : P1 → P2 between the sets of rule names. The mapping fP must
preserve the structure of the rules in the sense that the rule corresponding to the name fP (x) re-
duces to the rule corresponding to the name x if the retyping induced by fTG is forgotten. More
precisely:
Deﬁnition 8 (Framework morphism). A framework morphism between security policy frameworks SPi
= (T Gi, (Pi, rPi ), P osi, Negi) for i = 1, 2 is a pairf = (fTG, fP ) : SP1 → SP2,wherefTG : TG1 →
TG2 is a total graph morphism and fP : P1 → P2 is a total mapping, so that VfTG(rP2(fP (p))) = rP1(p)
for all p ∈ P1.
Note that the deﬁnition of a framework morphism does not constrain the sets of constraints.
Example 9 (Framework morphism). Consider, as an example, the framework morphism f : SP1 →
SP2 with the total graph morphism fTG in Fig. 7 between the type graphs TG1 and TG2. The intended
meaning of this morphism is that the types A and B of the security framework SP1 are renamed to
C and D, respectively, and that there is a new type E in the security framework SP2. The rule p1 of
SP1 can be mapped to the rule p2 of SP2, since the application of the forgetful functor VfTG to p2
yields the rule p1. The rule p1 cannot be mapped to the rule p′2 since the forgetful functor yields a rule
different from p1.
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Fig. 7. Framework morphism.
5. Access control policy integration by pushouts
Integration is concerned with the merging of AC policies. A merge is necessary on the syntactical
level, i.e. a merge of the security policy frameworks, and on the semantical level, i.e. the merge of
the system graphs representing the state at merge time. We consider here only the integration on the
syntactical level and omit the integration on the semantical level (semantical integration is considered in
more detail in [10]). The integration of two AC policies on the syntactical level is a pushout of the security
policy frameworks in the category SP (see the appendix). Two security policy frameworks SP1 and SP2
are related by an auxiliary framework SP0 that identiﬁes the common parts (types and rules) in both
frameworks; the actual integration is formally expressed by framework morphisms f1 : SP0 → SP1
and f2 : SP0 → SP2. The pushout of f1 and f2 in SP integrates the frameworks SP1 and SP2 in a
new security policy framework SP called the integrated framework. Informally, it is the union of the two
policies SP1 and SP2 where the common subpolicy SP0 is not duplicated.
Throughout this section, the integration of the lattice-based access control (LBAC) framework with an
ACL framework (introduced next in Section 5.1) is used as an example.
5.1. Access control list
The access control list (ACL) policy is an implementation of a discretionary AC policy. We consider an
ACL policy similar, but simpler, to that one used in the UNIX operating system. Our model distinguishes
only between the owner of an object and the rest of theworld and, for simplicity, groups are not considered.
The owner of the object has read, write and execution rights and can change the access permissions of
the object with respect to the world.
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Fig. 9. Graph rules for the ACL model.
Example 10 (Graph rules for the ACL). The type graph TGACL in Fig. 8 provides the node types U, O
and P. Just as in the LBAC model, a node of type U represents a user, a node of type O an object, and
a node of type P a process. An edge between a user node U and an object node O speciﬁes that U is the
owner of the object O. An edge of type R,W or X represents the read, write or execute permission of an
object to the world. The owner of the object has always all the permissions for his/her objects and does
not need the loops. Some of the ACL graph rules are shown in Fig. 9. The rule new process starts a
new process on behalf of a user. To kill a process, the rule remove process deletes the process node
and its connection to the user. The rule create object adds a new nodeOx to the system, connecting
it to the process node Px that has created the object and to the user nodeUx to which the process belongs.
The rule connect connects a process of a user to an object of the user. The rule has a NAC (indicated
by the dashed edge between Px and Ox on the left-hand side of the rule) that forbids the application of
the rule to processes and objects of the user already connected. The rule give read gives to the world
the read permission on an object, provided that it has not already been granted. Other rules such as give
write and give execution are similar and not shown.
Example 11 (Constraints for ACL). The constraints for the ACL framework in Fig. 10 require that each
process belongs to a unique user (the positive constraint d1 and the negative constraint d2), that each
object belongs to a unique user (the positive constraint d3 and the negative constraint d4) and that there
is at most one permission loop with the same permission attached to the same object (negative constraint
d5). Note that the last diagram represents three negative constraints, one for R, one forW and one for X.
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Fig. 10. Positive and negative constraints for the ACL.
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U
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R
W
X
U
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OSLP
P SL O
Fig. 11. Integrated type graph for the combined LBAC and ACL security model.
5.2. Integration of ACL and LBAC
The type graph in the middle of Fig. 11 shows the types common to ACL and LBAC. The U, O and
the P type nodes are to be considered the same in both models. The edge between the U and the P node
is a common part as well. The gluing (pushout) of the two type graphs is the type graph at the bottom
of Fig. 11.
All rules are kept in the integrated security policy framework, but their component graphs are now
typed over the integrated type graph. The constraints of the integrated policy framework in this example
are given by the union of the constraint sets of the LBAC model (now typed over the integrated type
graph) and the ACL model. Other combinations of the sets of constraints are possible (see the appendix
and the next section).
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6. Coherence
The graphs that can be constructed by the rules of a framework represent the system states possible
within the policy model. These graphs are called system graphs in the sequel. We Have added the
constraints to the security policy framework to have a declarative description of wanted and unwanted
system graphs, but we have not related the constraints with the rules of a framework. Do the rules construct
all the wanted system graphs required by the positive constraints and do the rules prevent the construction
of unwanted system states expressed by the negative constraints? If the rules do so, the framework is
called coherent.
Deﬁnition 12 (Coherence). A security policy framework is positive (resp. negative) coherent if all system
graphs satisfy the constraints in Pos (resp. Neg).
A security policy framework is coherent if it is both positive and negative coherent.
If we consider the integrated security framework in Section 5, in which the set of rules and constraints
is constructed by the union of rules and constraints of the LBAC security framework and the ACL security
framework, we realize that the integrated framework is not coherent. An example of such an inconsistency
is given by the LBAC constraints c1 and c3 in Fig. 6, which require a security level for each object and
process, and by the ACL rules that create objects and processes without a security level, generating graphs
that do not satisfy the constraints c1 and c3. Moreover, we have now both the negative LBAC constraint
c5 which forbids an owner for any object and the positive ACL constraint d3 which requires an owner
for each object. The constraints are in conﬂict in the sense that it is not possible to ﬁnd a graph satisfying
both constraints at the same time.
Beside the conﬂicts that render a framework incoherent, because of the rules that produce graphs which
does not satisfy the constraints, we have conﬂicts even if the rules may produce only graphs that satisfy the
constraints. These conﬂicts occur between rules stemming from different component policy frameworks.
Consider as an example the LBAC rule new object in Fig. 3 and the ACL rule create object in
Fig. 12. The rule create object creates an object with a security level, the rule new object an
object without one. Which rule shall be applied in this type of conﬂict?
The examples show that an integration of previously coherent frameworks does not lead in general to a
coherent framework. Problemsmayoccur between a rule and a constraint, between twoormore constraints
or between two ormore rules.We investigate ﬁrst how the pushout preserves coherence. Since the pushout
cannot guarantee conﬂict-freeness, in the following sections we consider conﬂict management strategies
to resolve conﬂicting constraints, conﬂicting rules and conﬂicts between a rule and a constraint.
PxUx Ux Px
Ox
SLx
LBAC 
new object
Vx
Ox
ACL
PxPx SLx
create object
Fig. 12. Two rules for creating objects: the rule new object of the LBAC model (left-hand side) and the rule create
object of the ACL (right-hand side).
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The question now is:
if the frameworks SP1 and SP2 are coherent, is the pushout SP also coherent? As shown before, this is
not generally the case. If we choose the intersection as the operation to construct the constraint sets of
the pushout framework (see Theorem A.4), coherence is preserved.
Proposition 13 (Preservation of coherence). Given the coherent frameworksSP1 andSP2 and the frame-
work morphisms f1 : SP0 → SP1 and f2 : SP0 → SP2, the pushout object SP = (T Gint, (P int, rP int),
P osint, Negint) of f1 and f2 inSPwithPosint = Fg′TG(Pos1)∩Ff ′TG(Pos2) andNegint = Fg′TG(Neg1)∩
Ff ′TG(Neg2) is coherent.
Proof. Each constraint in Negint is also given in Neg1 and Neg2 (up to re-typing). The intersection
requires that the negative constraints in Negint refer to common types only. Let G be a graph generated
by the rules in SP and c ∈ Negint. Since the policies SP1 and SP2 are coherent, their rules do not
create a graph that does not satisfy c (after re-typing). If the rules of SP1 and SP2 are not identiﬁed by
f and g, they occur up to re-typing in SP, i.e., they create in SP the same graphs as in SP1 and SP2,
respectively, all satisfying c. If a rule p1 from SP1 and a rule p2 from SP2 are identiﬁed by f and g,
their amalgamated rule is constructed in SP. The rules p1 and p2 perform the same action on the com-
mon types, as they differ only on the non-common types. Since the constraint c, however, refers only
to the common types, the amalgamated rule in SP cannot create more on the common types than the
component rules p1 and p2. Since they construct only coherent graphs, so does the amalgamated rule
in SP.
The argument for the satisfaction of constraints in Posint is similar. 
Coherencewith respect to the unionoperationon constraints (inTheoremA.4) is generally not preserved
by the pushout construction, as the ACL-LBAC integration example shows. The positive ACL constraint
d3, which requires a user for each object, is satisﬁed by the ACL rules, but the integrated framework
contains also the LBAC rules and, in particular, the rule new object, so that graphs that do not satisfy
d3 can be constructed.
The reason for the incoherence with respect to the constraints, in the case where the union operation
is used, can be reduced to the parts of the constraints referring to the common types. Coherence of
constraints referring to types occurring only in SP1 or only in SP2 is preserved.
Proposition 14. Given the coherent frameworks SP1 and SP2 and the framework morphisms f1 :
SP0 → SP1 and f2 : SP0 → SP2, the pushout SP = (T Gint, (P int, rP int), P osint, Negint) of
f1 and f2 in SP with PosintFg′TG(Pos1) ∪ Ff ′TG(Pos2) and NegintFg′TG(Neg1) ∪ Ff ′TG(Neg2) is in-
coherent if and only if SP is incoherent with respect to the constraints containing types
in TG0.
Proof. The direction ⇐ follows by deﬁnition. For the direction ⇒, consider a graph G generated by
the rules of SP that does not satisfy a constraint c of SP. If c is a constraint that refers to non-common
types occurring only in SP1 (resp. SP2), only the rules of SP1 (SP2) are concerned with these types. By
pushout construction, the rules of SP1 (SP2) occur up to re-typing as rules or sub-rules in SP. There are
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no other actions on non-common types in SP than those in SP1 (SP2). Therefore, the generated graph
structures with respect to the non-common types in SP1 and SP coincide and each constraint referring
only to non-common types is satisﬁed. 
7. Conﬂict management
The previous section shows that the satisfaction of constraints is generally not preserved when policies
are combined. By restricting the construction of the set of constraints, coherence can be achieved in
some cases, but there are still many practical cases that lead to inconsistent frameworks. Therefore, this
section investigates static conﬂict detection and automatic conﬂict resolution strategies to transform an
incoherent framework into a coherent framework.
We deal ﬁrst with conﬂicts between constraints, then consider conﬂicts between rules. The next section
deals with conﬂicts between rules and constraints.
7.1. Constraint–constraint conﬂict
In this section we discuss the problem of a security policy framework having constraints which require
contradictory properties of a system graph.
Deﬁnition 15 (Contradictory constraints, contradictory policy). Two constraints are contradictory iff
there are no graphs that properly satisfy both constraints. A security policy framework SP = (T G,
(P, rP ), Pos,Neg) is contradictory iff Neg ∪ Pos contains at least a pair of contradictory constraints.
An example is the integrated ACL-LBAC framework, where the ACL constraint d3 and the LBAC
constraint c5 cannot be satisﬁed by the same graph.
One way to determine whether a framework is contradictory is to analyze constraints in pairs.
Deﬁnition 16 (Conﬂict of constraints). Given two constraints ci : Xi → Yi for i = 1, 2, c1 is in conﬂict
with c2 iff there exist graph morphisms fX : X1 → X2 and fY : Y1 → Y2 such that fY ◦ c1 = c2 ◦ fX.
The conﬂict is strict if the diagram is a pushout. Two constraints c1 and c2 are in conﬂict if either c1 is in
conﬂict with c2 or c2 is in conﬂict with c1.
Conﬂicts of constraints can be classiﬁed in critical and harmless, the latter referring to constraints that
contain redundant restrictions as the following result indicates. In the harmless case, if c1 is in conﬂict
with c2, then c1 is really a subconstraint of c2.
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Fact 17 (Harmless conﬂicts). (1) If c1, c2 ∈ Neg and c1 is in conﬂict with c2, then if G satisﬁes c1, then
G satisﬁes c2.
(2) If c1, c2 ∈ Pos and c1 is in strict conﬂict with c2, then if G satisﬁes c1, then G satisﬁes c2.
Proof. (1) If g : X2 → G then g ◦ fX : X1 → G. If G did not satisfy c2, then there would exist
h : Y2 → G such that h ◦ c2 = g. But then g ◦ fX = h ◦ c2 ◦ fX = h ◦ fY ◦ c1, contradicting the fact
that G satisﬁes c1.
(2) If g : X2 → G then g ◦ fX : X1 → G. Since G satisﬁes c1, there exists h : Y1 → G such that
h ◦ c1 = g ◦ fX. By the Universal Property of pushouts, there exists k : Y2 → G such that k ◦ fY = h
and k ◦ c2 = g. The last equality is exactly what is needed to conclude that G satisﬁes c2. 
When the two constraints in conﬂict are one positive and one negative, then any graph satisfying one
cannot properly satisfy the other one.
Proposition 18 (Critical conﬂicts). If c1 is in conﬂict with c2, then
(1) if c1 ∈ Neg and c2 ∈ Pos, then if G satisﬁes c1, then G does not properly satisfy c2,
(2) if c1 ∈ Pos and c2 ∈ Neg, and the conﬂict is strict, then if G satisﬁes c1, then G does not properly
satisfy c2,
(3) if c1 ∈ Neg and fX does not satisfy c1, then if G properly satisﬁes c2 then G does not satisfy c1.
Proof. Let c1 be in conﬂict with c2 via fX and fY .
(1) If g : X2 → G and G satisﬁes c2, then there exists h : Y2 → G such that h ◦ c2 = g. But then for
g ◦ fX : X1 → G there exists h ◦ fY : Y1 → G such that h ◦ fY ◦ c1 = h ◦ c2 ◦ fX = g ◦ fX, which
says that G does not satisfy c1.
(2) If g : X2 → G and G satisﬁes c1, then there exists h : Y1 → G such that h ◦ c1 = g ◦ fX. By the
Universal Property of pushouts, there exists k : Y2 → G such that k ◦ fY = h and k ◦ c2 = g, and
thus G does not satisfy c2.
(3) Since by Deﬁnition 16 fX does not satisfy c1 there is a total morphism y : Y1 → X2 so that
y ◦ c1 = fX. If g2 : X2 → G then g ◦ fX : X1 → G and g ◦ y : Y1 → G with g ◦ fX = g ◦ y ◦ c1.
Therefore, G does not satisfy c1. 
The ACL constraint d3 in Fig. 10 and the LBAC constraint c5 in Fig. 6 are in a critical conﬂict.
Conﬂicts between constraints that render a framework contradictory can be resolved by removing
or weakening one of the constraints. Weakening a constraint means to require the satisfaction of the
constraint only conditionally. A condition for a constraint is a negative constraint that has to be satisﬁed
before the constraint is checked.
Deﬁnition 19 (Conditional constraint). A positive (negative) conditional constraint (x, c) consists of
a negative constraint x : X → N , called constraint condition, and a positive (negative) constraint
c : X → Y . A total graph morphism k : X → G satisﬁes a conditional constraint (x, c) if and only if
whenever k satisﬁes the constraint condition x, k also satisﬁes c. A graph G satisﬁes (x, c) iff each total
graph morphism k : X → G satisﬁes (x, c).
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A conditional constraint solves the conﬂict of a constraint c1 with a constraint c2 (via fX and fY ) by
introducing a constraint condition for c1 that requires the satisfaction of c1 if and only if c2 is vacuously
satisﬁed (i.e., the premise of c2 does not occur). The constraint condition fX has this property for c1.
Fact 20. Let c1 : X1 → Y1 be a constraint in conﬂictwith the constraint c2 : X2 → Y2 viafX : X1 → X2
and fY : Y1 → Y2, then G satisﬁes fX (considered as negative constraint) if and only if G vacuously
satisﬁes c2.
Proof. (⇒) If there exists a morphism g : X2 → G, then g ◦ fX : X1 → G and, therefore, G would not
satisfy fX. This is a contradiction to the assumption that G satisﬁes fX.
(⇐) The graph G can satisfy fX either vacuously or properly. If there is no morphism p : X1 → G,
then G satisﬁes fX vacuously. If there is a morphism p : X1 → G, then there cannot be a morphism
g : X2 → G with g ◦ fX = p since G vacuously satisﬁes c2. Hence G satisﬁes fX. 
Deﬁnition 21 (Conditional constraint conﬂict). A conditional constraint (x1 : X1 → N, c1 : X1 → Y1)
is in conﬂict with a conditional constraint (x2 : X2 → N, c2 : X2 → Y2) if c1 is in conﬂict with c2 (cf.
Deﬁnition 16) and fX satisﬁes x1.
Deﬁnition 22 (Weak constraint). Let c1 be a constraint in conﬂict with the constraint c2 via fX and fY .
The weak constraint cc21 for c1 with respect to c2 is the conditional constraint c
c2
1 = (fX, c1).
Fact 23. If c1 is a constraint in conﬂict with the constraint c2, then the weak constraint cc21 is not in
conﬂict with the constraint c2.
Proof.While there are still morphisms fX and fY , the morphism fX satisﬁes cc21 by construction of the
weak constraint, since fX does not satisfy the constraint condition of cc21 . Therefore, c
c2
1 and c2 are not
in conﬂict. 
The strategy adopted to solve conﬂicts (removing or weakening) depends on the particular application
and on the context of the conﬂict. If the conﬂict arises from a transition between two policy frameworks,
then a radical strategy giving priority to the new policy would consistently choose the constraint from
the surviving policy and remove the other one. In conﬂicts arising from integration, another strategy may
select constraints from either policy depending on the speciﬁc pair andweaken them.A general discussion
of strategies is outlined in [11]. It is worth stressing that determining a conﬂict between constraints can
be performed statically and automatically.
7.2. Rule-rule conﬂicts
Two rules are in a p-conﬂict (potential conﬂict) if they do (partly) the same things but under different
conditions. A conﬂict occurs if p-conﬂicting rules can be applied to the same system graph. The choice
for one rule in a conﬂict may prevent the applicability of the other rule. This kind of conﬂict is called
critical, otherwise it is only a harmless conﬂict.
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The example in Fig. 12 shows the LBAC rule new object and the ACL rule create object.
These rules are in p-conﬂict, since both rules create a new object nodeOx. The rule new object creates
an object with a security level, the rule create object an object without one.
A static analysis of the rules can detect the critical and the harmless conﬂicts before run-time so that
the rules can be changed to avoid the conﬂicts. The static analysis of the rules make is based on graph
transformation concepts.
Deﬁnition 24 (Conﬂict pair). Two rules p1 : L1 r1⇀R1 with application condition A(p1) and p2 :
L2
r2
⇀R2 with application condition A(p2) are in p-conﬂict if there exists a common non-empty sub-
rule for p1 and p2. 2
Each pair (m1 : L1 → G,m2 : L2 → G) of matchesm1 andm2 for rules p1 and p2, respectively, is a
conﬂict pair for p1 and p2. The rules p1 and p2 are in conﬂict, if they are in p-conﬂict and there exists a
conﬂict pair for p1 and p2. Otherwise, they are called conﬂict-free.
Notice that in Deﬁnition 24, mi , i = 1, 2, is a match for pi and therefore it satisﬁes the application
condition A(pi). The deﬁnition of a conﬂict between rules considers matches for p-conﬂicting rules into
arbitrary graphs. In general there exist inﬁnitely many matches for one rule, so that the decision cannot
be made whether two p-conﬂicting rules are in conﬂict by checking each of them. Therefore, the set of
matches must be reduced for a static analysis. To detect a conﬂicting rule pair, it is sufﬁcient to consider
all the gluings of the left-hand sides of the rules.
Deﬁnition 25 (Set of conﬂict pairs). Given p-conﬂicting rules (p1 : L1 r1⇀R1, A(p1)) and (p2 : L2 r2⇀
R2, A(p2)), the set CP(p1, p2) of conﬂict pairs for p1 and p2 consists of all conﬂict pairs (m1 : L1 →
G,m2 : L2 → G), where m1 and m2 are jointly surjective. 3
The set of conﬂict pairs for two rules in a rule-conﬂict consists of a ﬁnite number of pairs since the left-
hand side of a rule is a ﬁnite graph. It is sufﬁcient to investigate the conﬂict pairs into the set CP(p1, p2)
to decide the conﬂict-freeness of the two rules.
Theorem 26 (Conﬂict-freeness). Let CP(p1, p2) be the set of static conﬂict pairs for the p-conﬂicting
rules (p1 : L1 r1⇀R1, A(p1)) and (p2 : L2 r2⇀R2, A(p2)). Then, the rules p1 and p2 are conﬂict-free if
and only if CP(p1, p2) is empty.
Proof.We show thatp1 andp2 are in conﬂict if and only if there is a conﬂict pair (m1,m2) ∈ CP(p1, p2).
(⇒) If p1 and p2 are in conﬂict, there is a conﬂict pair (m1 : L1 → G,m2 : L2 → G). Let the outer
diagram below be the pullback of m1 and m2 and diagram (1) be the pushout of in1 and in2.
2 A rule p0 : L0
r0
⇀R0 is a subrule of rule p : L r⇀R if there are total morphisms fL : L0 → L and fR : R0 → R with
r ◦ fL = fR ◦ r0.
3 that is, m1(L1) ∪m2(L2) = G.
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The pair (m′1,m′2) is a conﬂict pair in CP(p1, p2) since m′1 and m′2 are jointly surjective by (pushout)
construction. Furthermore, they satisfy A(p1) and A(p2), respectively, since otherwise, there would be
total morphisms n′i : Ni → G′ with n′i ◦ xi = m′i for (xi : Li → Ni) ∈ A(pi) and i = 1, 2. Since
diagram (1) is a pushout diagram, there would exist a unique u : G′ → G with u ◦m′i = mi (i = 1, 2).
Therefore, the morphism u ◦ n′i for i = 1, 2 would prevent the satisfaction of (xi : Li → Ni) for mi .
This is a contradiction.
The direction⇐ follows directly from Deﬁnition 24. 
The set of conﬂict pairs for rules may be split into harmless conﬂict pairs and critical conﬂict pairs.
The distinction is based on whether the order of rule application is critical. For a critical conﬂict pair
(m1,m2) the order is important: after applying p1 at matchm1, the rule p2 is no longer applicable or vice
versa. For a harmless conﬂict pair (m1,m2) the order does not matter: after applying p1 at matchm1, the
rule p2 is still applicable and vice versa. Critical and harmless conﬂict pairs are deﬁned and detected by
the graph transformation concept of parallel independence [4].
Deﬁnition 27 (Parallel independence). Given rules (p1 : L1 r1⇀R1, A(p1)) and (p2 : L2 r2⇀R2, A(p2)),
the derivations G p1⇒H1 and G p2⇒H2 are parallel independent if r∗2 ◦m1 is total and satisﬁes A(p1) and
r∗1 ◦m2 is total and satisﬁes A(p2). Otherwise, the derivations are called parallel dependent.
Two derivations are parallel independent if the ﬁrst rule does not delete anything needed by the second
rule and it does not create anything that the NAC of the second rule forbids. The same conditions must
be satisﬁed for the second rule with respect to the ﬁrst rule. In the case of parallel independence, the
application of rule p1 at matchm1 and the subsequent application of rule p2 at r∗1 ◦m2 results in the same
graph (up to isomorphism) as the application of rule p2 at match m2 and the subsequent application of
rule p1 at r∗2 ◦m1. For a proof of this result, see [4].
Deﬁnition 28 (Harmless/critical conﬂict pair). A conﬂict pair (m1,m2) for rulesp1 andp2 is a harmless
conﬂict if the derivationsGp1,m1⇒ H1 andGp2,m2⇒ H2 are parallel independent. Otherwise, the conﬂict pair
is a critical conﬂict.
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SLxPx
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Fig. 13. The weak rule for new object and create object.
We propose two possible strategies to solve critical conﬂicts between p-conﬂicting rules. In the ﬁrst
strategy, one rule is given priority over the other one. One rule is chosen asmajor rule and denoted by p1,
and one as minor rule and denoted by p2. For a conﬂict pair (m1,m2), the rule p2 is changed by adding
a NAC that forbids its application at matchm2 if p1 can be applied atm1. The second strategy integrates
the two rules into one rule. In [11] we discuss alternative strategies.
Deﬁnition 29 (Weak rule). Given a conﬂict pair (m1,m2) for rules (p1 : L1 r1⇀R1, A(p1)) and (p2 :
L2
r2
⇀R2, A(p2)), the weak rule for p2 w.r.t. (m1,m2), denoted byWR(p1, p2, (m1,m2)), is the rule p2
with the NAC (L2, N), where the outer diagram below is a pullback and diagram (1) (the top half) is a
pushout diagram.
We call the NAC (L2, N) the weak condition and denote it byWC(p1, p2, (m1,m2))
The addition of the negative application condition WC(p1, p2, (m1,m2)) to the minor rule ensures
that the major and the minor rules cannot be applied both to the same system graph with matchesm1 and
m2, respectively.
Example 30 (Weak rule). Let us show an example of the weak rule, the rule extended by the weak
condition WC(p1, p2, (m1,m2)) in Deﬁnition 29. Fig. 13 shows the example of the p-conﬂicting ACL
rule create object and the LBAC rule new object. The set of conﬂict pairs for these two rules
has two elements: the inclusions (in1 : L1 → L1 ⊕ L2, in2 : L2 → L1 ⊕ L2) of the left-hand sides
into the disjoint union of left-hand sides, and the inclusions (in′1 : L1 → G, in′2 : L2 → G) of the
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Fig. 14. Amalgamation of rule-conﬂicting rules.
left-hand sides into the graph G, which is the gluing of the left-hand sides over the node Px. Fig. 13
shows the weak rules with respect to the second conﬂict pair. The weak rule for create object
w.r.t. new object has a NAC that forbids a security level for the process. Therefore, the weak rule for
create object is only applicable to processes belonging to the ACLmodel and without a counterpart
in the LBAC model. The weak rule for new object with respect to create object has a NAC
that forbids a user connected to the process. Since each user is connected to a process, the rule is never
applicable.
Proposition 31 (Major rule and extended minor rule are conﬂict-free). Given the set of conﬂict pairs
CP(p1, p2) for p-conﬂicting rulesp1 andp2, the rulep1 and the weak rulep′2 extended by aWC(p1, p2,
(m1,m2)) for each (m1,m2) ∈ CP(p1, p2) are conﬂict-free.
Proof. Let m2 : L2 → G be a match for p2 extended by WC(p1, p2, (m1,m2)) (see Deﬁnition 29),
i.e. m2 satisﬁes WC(p1, p2, (m1,m2)). If we assume that m1 : L1 → G is a match for p1, then there
exists, by construction of WC(p1, p2, (m1,m2)), a unique morphism u : N → G so that u ◦ n =
m2 (the outer diagram commutes by the pullback property). This is a contradiction, since m2 satisﬁes
WC(p1, p2, (m1,m2)). 
The second solution for solving conﬂicts between rules is the amalgamation of the conﬂicting rules
over their common subrule. The amalgamated rule for two rules over a common subrule has as left-
hand side the colimit of the subrule-morphisms for the left-hand sides, as right-hand side the colimit of
the subrule-morphisms for the right-hand sides and the rule morphism is given by the universal colimit
property [1]. The NACs of the rules are integrated over the common objects speciﬁed in the left-hand
sides.
Deﬁnition 32 (Amalgamated rule). Let (pi : Li ri⇀Ri,A(pi)) for i = 1, 2 be p-conﬂicting rules and
p0 : L0 r0⇀R0 with fLi : L0 → Li and fRi : R0 → Ri their common subrule (cf. Fig. 14).
The amalgamated rule of p1 and p2 with respect to p0 is given by (p : L r⇀R,A(p)), where diagram
(1) is the pushout of fL1 and fL2 , diagram (2) is the pushout of fR1 and fR2 and r is the induced universal
pushout morphism.
22 M. Koch et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 71 (2005) 1–33
Ux Ux
Ux Ux Px
Ox
Vx
SLxPx
Px
Ox
Ox
Vx
SLx
SLx
ACL
Px
LBAC 
new object
SLxPx
Px
integrated rule
create object
Fig. 15. Amalgamation of rule-conﬂicting rules create object and new object.
The set A(p) contains a NAC n : L → N for each pair of NACs n1 : L1 → N1 ∈ A(p1) and
n2 : L2 → N2 ∈ A(p2), where N is the pushout of n1 ◦ fL1 and n2 ◦ fL2 and n is the induced universal
pushout morphism.
Example 33. Fig. 15 shows the amalgamated rule for the rules create object and new object.
Their common subrule is shaded in the rules and contains the process node Px in the left-hand side and
the nodes Px andOx in the right-hand side. The amalgamated rule creates an object that belongs to a user
as well as a process and carries a security level.
The amalgamated rule answers the question “which rule shall be applied in a conﬂict” by “both”
instead of favouring one. As in the case of constraints, the actual conﬂict resolution strategy depends
on the application and the context of the conﬂict. Also rule conﬂicts can be determined statically and
automatically.
8. Rule-constraint conﬂict
In this section, in order to address conﬂicts between constraints and rules, we classify rules in deleting
and expanding rules. Deleting rules delete graph elements, but do not add anything (i.e., range(r) =
R ⊂ L); expanding rules may add graph elements, but do not delete anything (i.e., dom(r) = L ⊆ R).
A conﬂict between a rule and a constraint occurs when the application of the rule produces a graph
which does not satisfy the constraint. The potential for conﬂict can be checked statically directly with
the rule and the constraint without knowledge of speciﬁc graphs and derivations. A deleting rule never
violates a negative constraint, since the rule does not add forbidden graph elements. But a deleting rule
may violate a positive constraint if the rule deletes conditionally required graph elements but preserves
the condition for their existence. An expanding rule may violate both negative and positive constraints:
it may add forbidden graph elements speciﬁed in a negative constraint or it may complete the condition
for a positive constraint without making sure that the required graph elements exist under this condition
as well.
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Deﬁnition 34 (Rule-constraint conﬂicts). Let p : L r⇀R be an expanding rule and c : X → Y a con-
straint, then p and c are in conﬂict if there exists a non-empty graph S and injective total morphisms
s1 : S → R and s2 : S → X so that s1(S) ∩ (R \ r(L)) = ∅.
Let p : L r⇀R be a deleting rule and c : X → Y a positive constraint, then p and c are in conﬂict
if there exists a non-empty graph S and injective total morphisms s1 : S → L and s2 : S → Y so that
s1(S) ∩ (L \ dom(r)) = ∅ and s2(S) ∩ (Y \X) = ∅.
Conﬂicts between rules p and constraints c : X → Y can be resolved by adding NACs to the rules p.
We present next the construction of these negative application conditions and then show how it is used
to resolve conﬂicts.
Deﬁnition 35 (Reduction). Given a rule p : L r⇀R and a non-empty overlap S between R and the
conclusion Y of the constraint c : X → Y as in the following diagram:
Let C = R +S Y be the pushout object of s1 : S → R and c ◦ s2 : S → Y in the category Graph,
and let C r
−1,h⇒ N be the derivation with the inverse rule p−1 : R r−1→L with match h. Deﬁne A(p, c) =
{(L,N)| C (r−1,h)⇒ N , C = R +S Y for some overlap S}. The rule p(c) consists of the partial morphism
L
r
⇀R and the set A(p, c) of NACs and is called the reduction of p by c.
The construction considers arbitrary rules and constraints, i.e., it is not restricted to deleting or expand-
ing rules, respectively. This construction reduces to the one described in [8] if the constraint c : X → Y
is the identity morphism.
The construction in Deﬁnition 35 may generate redundant application conditions. In fact, if we assume
that G already satisﬁes the constraint c, some application conditions are automatically satisﬁed. This
corresponds to the case where the overlap S → R can be decomposed into S → L → R. The graph N
generated from such an overlap can be eliminated directly from Deﬁnition 35 by requiring only overlaps
S for which s1(S) ∩ (R \ r(L)) = ∅. In this manner, the application condition NAC1 of Fig. 18 can be
removed.
Another form of redundancy stems from the fact that if S1 with morphisms s11 and s
1
2 and S2 with
morphisms s21 and s
2
2 are overlaps and, say, S1 ⊆ S2, s11 |S1 = s21 , s12 |S1 = s22 then C2 = R+S2 Y ⊆ C1 =
R+S1 Y and thusN2 ⊆ N1. Hence, if a match L→ G satisﬁes (L,N2), then it also satisﬁes (L,N1) and
the application condition (L,N1) can be removed fromA(p, c). Consider for example Fig. 17, where the
overlap S1 is included into the overlap S3. Therefore, NAC3 ⊆ NAC1 (cf. Fig. 18) and we can remove
NAC1.
In the next subsections, the different combinations of expanding/deleting rules and positive/negative
constraints are analyzed and the appropriate preservation results presented.
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8.1. Conﬂicts between constraints and deleting rules
There can be no conﬂict between a deleting rule p : L r⇀R and a negative constraint c : X → Y , since
the deleting rule may remove parts of Y, in which case c is trivially satisﬁed, or parts of X, in which case
c is vacuously satisﬁed.
Theorem 36 (Deleting preserves satisfaction). Let p : L r⇀R be a deleting rule,G a graph that satisﬁes
the negative constraint c : X → Y and G p⇒H , then H satisﬁes c
Proof. By deﬁnition, the following is a pushout diagram:
Since p is deleting, there exist total morphisms f : R → L and g : H → G such that m ◦ f = g ◦m∗.
Let k : X → H . If H did not satisfy c, then there would exist a morphism q : Y → H such that
X
c→Y q→H = X k→H . But then X c→Y q→H g→G = X k→H g→G, contradicting the assumption
that G satisﬁes c. 
For the conﬂict between deleting rules and positive constraints, it is possible to add NACs that prevent
the rule from destroying the conclusion Y, by preventing the applicability in the presence of X if part of
the conclusion Y is intended to be deleted by the rule.
Theorem 37 (Satisfaction by reduction). Let p : L r⇀R be a deleting rule and G a graph that satisﬁes
the positive constraint c : X → Y . Furthermore, let p(idY ) = (idL,A(idL, c)) be the reduction of
idL : L → L by idY : Y → Y , and deﬁne p(c) = (r, A(idL, c)). If Gp(c)⇒ H is a derivation with p(c),
then H satisﬁes c.
Proof. Let Gp(c)⇒ H via the matching morphism m : L→ G and k : X → H a morphism.
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negative constraint
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SL SL
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Fig. 16. Negative constraint for the LBAC model which requires at most one successor security lattice level.
Since p is deleting and r is injective, k′ = r∗−1 ◦ k : X → H → G is well-deﬁned and total. By the
assumption that G satisﬁes c : X → Y , there exists a total morphism q : Y → G such that q ◦ c = k′.
Now (r∗ ◦ q) ◦ c = r∗ ◦ (q ◦ c) = r∗ ◦ (r∗−1 ◦ k) = k, so that the proof is complete if we can show
that r∗ ◦ q : Y → H is total. Since q is total, it is sufﬁcient to show that r∗ is deﬁned for q(y) for every
y ∈ Y . Suppose not. Then, for some y ∈ Y and l ∈ L \ dom(r), q(y) = m(l) deﬁning hence an overlap
of L and Y and thus contradicting the assumption that m satisﬁes the NAC A(idL, c) of p(c). 
8.2. Conﬂicts between negative constraints and expanding rules
For the conﬂict between expanding rules and negative constraints, the NACs prevent the rule from
completing the conclusionY of the negative constraint c : X → Y . The following result conﬁrms that the
construction is the appropriate one.
Theorem 38 (Reduction preserves satisfaction). Let p : L r⇀R be an expanding rule and G a graph
that satisﬁes the negative constraint c : X → Y . If p(c) is the reduction of p by c and Gp(c)⇒ H is a
derivation with p(c), then H satisﬁes c.
Proof.Suppose, looking for a contradiction, that there exists amorphismf : Y → H . SinceH = R+LG,
there exist partial morphisms fR : Y → R and fG : Y → G such that fR ∪ fG = f . Since G satisﬁes
c, fR cannot be empty. Hence there exist an overlap S of R and Y which generates one of the NACs in
A(p, c) in Deﬁnition 35. This contradicts the applicability of p(c) to G necessary to produce H. 
Example 39 (Negative constraints and expanding rules conﬂict). We give an example for the LBAC
model to which we add the negative constraint in Fig. 16, denoted by c(succ) in the sequel, which
forbids two (or more) successors for a security level. The (expanding) rule new level 2 in Fig. 5 may
produce an inconsistent state by adding a successor level to a security level which already has a successor.
Fig. 17 shows non-empty overlaps S1, S2 and S3 of the right-hand side of the rule new level 2
and the constraint c(succ). The remaining overlaps use the same subgraphs S1, S2 and S3, but different
morphisms s1 and s2. For each overlap S, the pushout (C,R → C,X → C) of the morphisms S → R
and S → X → Y is constructed (see Fig. 17 for the example overlaps). The application condition (L,N)
is constructed by applying the inverse rule 4 of new level 2 to the graphs Ci resulting in the graphs
4 The inverse rule of a rulep : L r⇀Rwith an application condition is the rulep−1 : R r
−1
⇀ Lwithout the application condition.
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Fig. 17. Non-empty overlaps between the right-hand side R of new level 2 and the conclusion Y of the negative constraint
c(succ).
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Fig. 18. NACs constructed from the overlaps.
Ni. The inverse rule of new level 2 deletes a security level. The generated application condition for
the gluing C is then the pair (L,N). Fig. 18 shows the pairs (L,N) for the three overlaps in Fig. 17. We
depict only the graph N in which the graph L is drawn by solid lines, and the part N \L by dashed lines.
8.3. Conﬂicts between positive constraints and expanding rules
The following result shows that the construction in Deﬁnition 35 is sufﬁcient to guarantee the preser-
vation of satisfaction of constraints in the case of an expanding rule and a positive constraint too.
Theorem 40 (Reduction preserves satisfaction). Let p : L r⇀R be an expanding rule and G a graph
that satisﬁes the positive constraint c : X → Y . If p(idX) is the reduction of p by idX : X → X, and
G
p(idX)⇒ H is a derivation with p(idX), then H satisﬁes c.
Proof. The proof is this result is straightforward. By construction, the reduction of p by idX prevents
the application of p from constructing additional occurrences of X in H. Therefore, either H vacuously
satisﬁes c (no occurrences of X in H) or occurrences of X in H are inherited from G. Since G satisﬁes c,
the occurrence of X can be extended to Y and, since p is expanding, it remains in H. 
For the conﬂict between expanding rules and positive constraints, the NACs prevent the rule from
completing the condition X.
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Fig. 19. The negative application condition is too strong.
Example 41 (Positive constraints and expanding rules conﬂict). Fig. 19 on the left-hand side describes
an example for the reduction of the expanding rule create object and a positive constraint which
requires a value for each object. The reduction adds a NAC (L,L) which has been drawn explicitly. The
right-hand side of the ﬁgure shows the deleting rule delete level and a positive constraint which
requires a security level for each object. TheNAC for the ruledeletelevel is theNACof the reduction
of the identity rule on the node SLx by the identity morphism on the conclusion of the constraint. This
NAC forbids the deletion of security levels that are connected to an object. This NAC is already described
in Fig. 5 and shows the correctness of our LBAC graph model with respect to the rule delete level
and the constraint for the existence of a security level for each object.
The solution for conﬂicts between expanding rules and negative constraints as well as for conﬂicts
between deleting rules and positive constraints is a reasonable reduction of the number of system graphs
which the rules can produce. The solution for conﬂicts between expanding rules and positive constraints,
however, is not very satisfactory, since it reduces the number of system graphs that can be generated more
than necessary. For example, the reduction of the rule create object by the positive constraint in Fig.
19 preserves consistency, but it cannot be applied since the NAC is never satisﬁed. This example of the
required object value suggests for positive constraints and expanding rules a construction which extends
the right-hand side of a rule so that the rule creates the entire conclusionY of a constraint c : X → Y and
not only parts of it, when the rule constructs part of X. In the object value example, the right-hand side of
the rule create object must not only create the object node Ox, but Ox together with a value node.
The construction in Deﬁnition 42 describes the details of a possible solution.
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Deﬁnition 42 (Completing rule). Let c : X → Y be a positive constraint and p : L r→R an expanding
rule. The completing rule p∗(c) for p and c is given by vi ◦ hi ◦ r : L→ R′, where
•  = {R s
i
1← Si
si2→X, I = 1, . . . n} is the set of all non-empty overlaps of R and X so that si1(Si)∩ (R \
r(L)) = ∅,
• for each R s
i
1← Si
si2→X ∈ , (Ci, hi, yi) is the pushout of the injective morphisms si1 and c ◦ si2 in
Graph,
• (R′, vi : Ci → R′) is the colimit of the morphisms hi : R → Ci in Graph.
Notice that, by deﬁnition of colimit, vi ◦ hi = vj ◦ hj , for all i, j , and therefore the choice of the index
in deﬁning p∗(c) = vi ◦ hi ◦ r : L→ R′ is immaterial.
Fig. 20 illustrates the construction of the completing rule for the rulecreateobject and the positive
constraint in the left-hand side of Fig. 19. The ﬁgure shows the only non-empty overlap of R and Xwhich
contains created elements. The construction extends the right-hand side of the rule create object so
that the value node for the new object is also created.
The completing rule, however, does not preserve consistency for each positive constraint. The coun-
terexample in Fig. 21 shows the completing rule for a rule which creates a nodeA and a positive constraint
c which requires all nodes A and B to be connected via a C node. The completing rule pc(c) is applied to
a consistent graph G on the right-hand side of Fig. 21, but the resulting graph H is not consistent.
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Fig. 20. Construction of the completing rule.
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If we restrict positive constraints to single positive constraints, the construction always produces a
consistency—preserving rule. A positive constraint c : X → Y is a single positive constraint if X
contains at most one node.
Proposition 43. If c is a single positive constraint, the completing rule p∗(c) for a rule p is consistent
with respect to c.
Proof. Let G be a graph which is consistent with respect to c : X → G, and Gp∗(c)⇒ H a derivation with
p∗(c) and co-match m∗ : R′ → H . If there is no morphism g : X → H , then H vacuously satisﬁes c.
If c is a single positive constraint and there is a graph morphism g : X → H , then g(X) ⊆ H \m∗(R′)
or g(X) ⊆ m∗(R′). If g(X) ⊆ H \ m∗(R′) then g(X) contains only elements already occurring in G.
Since G satisﬁes c, there is a morphism q : Y → H with g = q ◦ c. If g(X) ⊆ m∗(R′) then X is one
of the overlaps Si between X and R in the construction of Deﬁnition 42. If S1 is the overlap, then, since
C1 is the pushout object, there is a morphism y1 : Y → C1 so that m∗ ◦ v1 ◦ y1 is the needed extension
of g. 
Another possibility to resolve conﬂicts between positive constraints and expanding rules p is to trans-
form the positive constraint into a rule and then require that this rule be applied (after the application of p)
as long as there are occurrences of X not “visited” in H. The new rule is just the total morphism X → Y
with negative application condition (X, Y ) to avoid its application repeatedly on the same part of H.
Deﬁnition 44 (Constraint-repair rule). For a positive constraint c : X → Y , the constraint-repair rule
for c is given by rep(c) = c : X → Y with NAC (X, Y ).
The proof of the following result is straightforward.
Proposition 45 (Satisfaction after repair). Let p : L r⇀R be an expanding rule and G a graph that
satisﬁes the positive constraint c : X → Y . If G ⇒ H is a derivation consisting of applying the
expanding rule p once and thenH ′ is obtained by applying to H the constraint-repair rule rep(c) as long
as possible, then H ′ satisﬁes c.
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It is necessary to add “control” on the framework to ensure that this new rule is applied ‘as long as
possible’. Control can be introduced either by using rule expressions [7] or the notion of a transformation
unit [14] as an encapsulation mechanism used in a way similar to procedure calls.
9. Concluding remarks
In the formalism presented here to specify AC policies, states are represented by graphs and their
evolution by graph transformations. A policy is formalized by four components: a type graph, positive
and negative constraints (a declarative way of describing what is wanted and what is forbidden) and a set
of rules (an operational way of describing what can be constructed). The framework offers the conceptual
tools needed to discuss the effect of integrating two policies using a pushout in the category of policy
frameworks and framework morphisms.
An important problem addressed here is how to deal with inconsistencies caused by conﬂicts between
two constraints, between two rules or between a rule and a constraint. Often such problems arise when
trying to predict the behavior of an AC policy obtained by integrating two separate coherent policies [10].
The conﬂict between a rule of one policy and a simple constraint of the other policy has already been
addressed in part elsewhere [12,13], where it is also shown the adequacy of this framework to represent
different Access Control policies. Here we have tackled the problem of conﬂicts by making effective use
of the graph-based formalism. Conﬂicts are detected and resolved statically by using standard formal
tools typical of this graph-based formalism. In the process, we have introduced the notions of conditional
constraint and of weakening of a rule.
We have shown how conﬂicts can be detected in a security framework and proposed several strategies to
automatically resolve the conﬂicts. Since there are several possible resolution strategies, the administrator
has a choice. These resolution strategies are meta policies, that deal with the choices in the application
of policies. We have introduced the notion of a metapolicy in [13] and proposed three examples:
• The meta policy radical chooses a major policy SP1 and a minor policy SP2 and solves the problem
of conﬂicting rules or constraints globally by selecting the rules or constraints of SP1 and deleting the
rules and constraints of SP2.
• The meta policy weakRadical keeps the conﬂicting rules or constraints of SP2, but weakens them to
favour the application or the satisfaction, respectively, of the corresponding rules and constraints of
SP1.
• The meta policy static keeps some rules and constraint from SP1 and some from SP2, weakening the
corresponding conﬂicting rules and constraints of the other policy. The choice of which one to weaken
is made on a pair-by-pair basis.
The choice of the appropriate meta policy may depend on the speciﬁc application domain of the particular
AC model.
Among the problems still under investigation are the transition from a system using one policy to a
system using another policy.
A tool, based on a generic graph transformation engine, is under development to assist in the system-
atic detection and resolution of conﬂicts and in the stepwise modiﬁcation of an evolving policy while
maintaining its coherence.
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Appendix A. Category of security policy frameworks
We provide in this appendix the categorical formalization of our model by deﬁning the category of
security policy frameworks and framework morphisms.
Deﬁnition A.1 (Category of security policy frameworks). The category of security policy frameworks,
denoted by SP, has as objects all security policy frameworks and as morphisms all frameworkmorphisms.
Proof. For each framework SP, the pair idSP = (idTG, idP ) is the identitymorphism and the composition
of framework morphisms f = (fTG, fP ) : SP1 → SP2 and g = (gTG, gP ) : SP2 → SP3 is deﬁned
componentwise as the morphism g ◦ f = (gTG ◦ fTG, gP ◦ fP ) : SP1 → SP3. The composition is
associative since the composition for the component morphisms is associative. 
Since a frameworkmorphism does not constrain the sets of constraints, frameworks with an isomorphic
type graph and isomorphic rules are isomorphic, independently of their constraint sets.
Proposition A.2 (Framework isomorphisms). The framework morphism f = (fTG, fP ) : SP → SP ′
with SP = (T G, (P, rP ), Pos,Neg) and SP ′ = (T G′, (P ′, r ′P ), Pos′, Neg′) is an isomorphism if and
only if fTG : TG→ TG′ and fP : P → P ′ are isomorphisms in the appropriate categories.
Proof.⇒: If f is an isomorphism, there is a framework morphism g : SP ′ → SP so that f ◦ g = idSP ′
and g ◦ f = idSP . Then, fTG ◦ gTG = idSP ′TG and gTG ◦ fTG = idSPTG , i.e., fTG is an isomorphism.
Furthermore, fP ◦ gP ′ = idSP ′P and gP ′ ◦ fP = idSPP ′ , i.e. fP is an isomorphism.⇐: If the component morphisms fTG and fP are isomorphisms, then by deﬁnition of composition
so is f. 
Proposition A.3 (Initial security policy framework). The initial object in SP is given by the security
policy framework SPI = (∅, (∅, r),∅,∅).
Proof. Given SP = (T G, (P, rP ), Pos,Neg), we deﬁne i = (iTG, iP ) : SPI → SP , where iTG : ∅ →
TG is the unique morphism for the initial graph ∅ and TG and iP : ∅ → P is the unique morphism for
the set ∅ and P. The properties of the initial component objects in the respective categories ensure the
required property for SPI . 
Security policy frameworks can be glued together using the standard categorical constructions.
Theorem A.4 (Pushouts). The category SP has all pushouts.
Proof. Let Op : Set × Set → Set be an operation on sets. For given framework morphisms f : SP0 →
SP1 and g : SP0 → SP1 the pushout SP = (T G, (P, rP ), Pos,Neg) is constructed as follows:
(1) Construct the pushout of fTG and gTG in the category Graph (diagram (1)).
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(2) Construct the pushout of fP and gP in Set (diagram (2)).
(3) The mapping rP (x) is deﬁned for all x ∈ P as follows:
(a) if there is a y ∈ P1 with g′P (P1)(y) = x and x /∈ f ′P (P2) then rP (x) = Fg′TG(rP1(y)),
(b) if there is a y ∈ P2 with f ′P (P2)(y) = x and x /∈ g′P (P1) then rP (x) = Ff ′TG(rP2(y)),
(c) if x ∈ g′P (P1) ∩ f ′P (P2), then there is a non-empty set X ⊂ P0 so that for each x0 ∈ X,
g′P (fP (x0)) = f ′P (gP (x0)) = x by construction of pushouts in Set. We explain the construction
of rP (x) for the case of a singleton set X = {x0}. This construction can then be generalized to an
arbitrary set X. By deﬁnition of framework morphisms, rP0(x0) is a subrule of rP1(fP (x0)) := y
and rP2(gP (x0)) := y′. The two squares L0 → L1 → L ← L2 and R0 → R1 → R ← R2 in
the diagram below on the right are pushouts in Graph and rP (x) is given by the unique pushout
property. 5
(4) The set of positive constraints is deﬁned as PosOp(Fg′TG(Pos1), Ff ′TG(Pos2)), the set of negative
constraints as Neg = Op(Fg′TG(Neg1), Ff ′TG(Neg2))
The pushout morphisms are deﬁned as g′ = (g′TG, g′P ) : SP1 → SP and f ′ = (f ′TG, f ′P ) :
SP2 → SP .
To check, that SP is a framework, the well-deﬁnedness of rP has to be shown. For cases 3(a) and 3(b)
the well-deﬁnedness follows from the fact that g′P |P1\fP (P0) and f ′P |P2\gP (P0) are injective. For case 3(c),
the rules rP0(x0) for each x0 ∈ X are equal due to the deﬁnition of a framework morphism. This ensures
a well-deﬁned construction of rP (x). By construction, the morphisms f ′, g′ are framework morphisms
such that g′ ◦ f = f ′ ◦ g. Let SP ′ = (T G′, (P ′ : rP ′), P os′, Neg′) be a security policy framework with
framework morphisms a : SP1 → SP ′ and b : SP2 → SP ′ so that a ◦ f = b ◦ g. By construction, there
is a unique total graph morphism uTG : TG → TG′ with uTG ◦ g′TG = aTG and uTG ◦ f ′TG = bTG.
Moreover, there is a unique mapping uP : P → P ′ with uP ◦g′P = aP and uP ◦f ′P = bP . The deﬁnition
u = (uTG, uP ) : SP → SP ′ yields a framework morphism by deﬁnition of rP . The commutativity
property and the uniqueness of this morphism follow from the corresponding properties of the component
morphisms.
The pushout construction deﬁnes the constraint sets in the pushout framework as the result of an
operation Op on sets. This operation Op may be the union or the intersection, etc. Proposition A.2
shows that the choice of the operation Op does not inﬂuence the pushout property. The actual op-
eration, however, becomes important when we consider the coherence of a security framework in
Section 6.
By combining the previous two results, we obtain the last result of this paper. 
5 This construction is known as amalgamation of rules [16].
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Theorem A.5 (Colimits). The category SP is ﬁnitely complete.
References
[1] P. Böhm, H.-R. Fonio, A. Habel, Amalgamation of graph transformations: a synchronisation mechanism, J. Comput.
System Sci. 34 (1987) 377–408.
[2] D. Bell, L. LaPadula, Secure computer systems:Mathematical foundations and model, Technical Report 2 (2547), MITRE,
1973.
[3] A. Corradini, H. Ehrig, M. Löwe, J. Padberg, The category of typed graph grammars and their adjunction with categories
of derivations, in: Fifth International Workshop on Graph Grammars and their Application to Computer Science, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1073, Springer, Berlin, 1996, pp. 56–74.
[4] H. Ehrig, R.Heckel,M.Korff,M. Löwe, L. Ribeiro, A.Wagner, A. Corradini, Algebraic approaches to graph transformation
part II: single pushout approach and comparisonwith double pushout approach, in: G. Rozenberg (Ed.), Handbook ofGraph
Grammars and Computing by Graph Transformations, vol. I: Foundations, World Scientiﬁc, Singapore, 1997.
[6] M. Große-Rhode, F. Parisi-Presicce, M. Simeoni, Formal software speciﬁcation with reﬁnement and modules for typed
graph transformation systems, J. Comput. System Sci. 64 (2) (2002) 171–218.
[7] M. Große-Rhode, F. Parisi-Presicce, M. Simeoni, Reﬁnements of graph transformation systems via rule expressions, in:
H. Ehrig, G. Engels, H.-J. Kreowski, G. Rozenberg (Eds.), Proceedings of TAGT’98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 1764, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 368–382.
[8] R. Heckel, A. Wagner, Ensuring consistency of conditional graph grammars - a constructive approach, in: Proceedings
SEGRAGRA’95 Graph Rewriting and Computation, Electronic Notes of TCS, vol. 2, 1995.
[9] M. Koch, L.V. Mancini, F. Parisi-Presicce, A formal model for role-based access control using graph transformation, in: F.
Cuppens, Y. Deswarte, D. Gollmann, M. Waidner (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sixth European Symposium on Research in
Computer Security (ESORICS 2000), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1895, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 122–139.
[10] M. Koch, L.V. Mancini, F. Parisi-Presicce, On the speciﬁcation and evolution of access control policies, in: S.L. Osborn
(Ed.), Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies, ACM, May 2001, pp.
121–130.
[11] M. Koch, L.V. Mancini, F. Parisi-Presicce, Foundations for a graph-based approach to the speciﬁcation of access control
policies, in: F. Honsell, M. Miculan (Eds.), Proceedings of Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
(FoSSaCS 2001), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2030, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 287–302.
[12] M. Koch, L.V. Mancini, F. Parisi-Presicce, A graph based formalism for RBAC, ACM Trans. Inform. System Security 5
(3) (2002) 332–365.
[13] M. Koch, L.V.Mancini, F. Parisi-Presicce, Conﬂict detection and resolution in access control speciﬁcations, in:M. Nielsen,
U. Engberg (Eds.), Proceedings of Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures (FoSSaCS 2002), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Springer, Berlin, 2002, pp. 223–237.
[14] H.-J. Kreowski, S. Kuske, Graph transformation units and modules, in: H. Ehrig, G. Engels, H.-J. Kreowski, G. Rozenberg
(Eds.), Handbook of Graph Grammars and Computing by Graph Transformations, vol. II, World Scientiﬁc, Singapore,
1999, pp. 607–638 (Chapter 15).
[15] F. Parisi-Presicce, H. Ehrig, U. Montanari, Graph Rewriting with uniﬁcation and composition, in: H. Ehrig, M. Nagl, G.
Rozenberg, A. Rosenfeld (Eds.), International Workshop on Graph Grammars and their Application to Computer Science,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 291, Springer, Berlin, 1987, pp. 496–524.
[16] G. Rozenberg (Ed.), Handbook of Graph Grammars and Computing by Graph Transformations, vol. I: Foundations, World
Scientiﬁc, Singpore, 1997.
[17] R.S. Sandhu, Lattice-based access control models, IEEE Comput. 26 (11) (1993) 9–19.
[18] R.S. Sandhu, Role-based access control, in: M.V. Zelkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Computers, vol. 46, Academic Press, New
York, 1998.
[19] R.S. Sandhu, P. Samarati, Access control: principles and practice, IEEE Commun. Mag. (1994) 40–48.
